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Ideally, decisions regarding one’s health should be made after assessing the objective
probabilities of relevant outcomes. Nevertheless, previous beliefs and emotional
reactions also have a role in decision-making. Furthermore, the comprehension of
probabilities is commonly affected by the presentation format, and by numeracy.
This study aimed to assess the extent to which the influence of these factors might
vary between different medical conditions. A sample of university students were
presented with two health scenarios containing statistical information on the prevalence
of breast cancer and hypertension either through icon arrays (N = 71) or natural
frequencies (N = 72). They also received information regarding a preventive measure
(mammogram/low-sodium diet) and the likelihood of a positive mammogram or a rich-
sodium diet either when suffering or not suffering from the disease. Before seeing
the data, participants rated the severity of the disease and the inconvenience of the
preventive measure. After reading the health scenario, participants had to rate its
difficulty, and how worrisome it was. They had also to rate the prior probability of
suffering from this medical condition, and the posterior probability of it, provided a
positive mammogram or a rich-sodium diet. Finally, they rated the extent to which they
would recommend the preventive measures. All the rates used the same 1 (little)-8 (a
great deal) scale. Participants’ numeracy was also assessed. The scenarios differed
significantly in perceived severity and worry, with the cancer scenario obtaining higher
scores. Importantly, regression analyses showed that the recommendations in the two
health scenarios depended on different variables. A model taking into consideration
severity and worry rates best explained decisions in the cancer scenario; in contrast,
in the hypertension scenario the model that best explained the recommendations
comprised both the posterior probability estimate and the severity rate. Neither
numeracy nor presentation format affected recommendation but both affected difficulty,
worrying and probability rates. We conclude that previous perceptions of the severity of
a health condition modulate the use of probabilistic information for decision-making. The
roles of presentation format and numeracy in enabling patients to understand statistical
information are also discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
Passing from a doctor-centered to a patient-centered model
of health has led in the last decades to an increase in the
interest devoted to informed consent and how to ensure that
decisions are indeed knowledgeable. Informed consent should be
provided after the patient has understood the purpose, benefits
and potential risks of the alternatives proposed. Risks are often
conceptualized as a combined function of the probability of a loss
and its consequences (Lipkus, 2007). Hence, in health contexts,
risk assessment will depend on its probability but also on how
severe this risk is considered to be (Haase et al., 2013). Although
the probability and the subjective value of the outcome are
usually assumed to be independent constructs, Harris et al. (2009)
showed that this was not always the case. They found a main effect
of probability but, interestingly, estimation at each probability
level was higher when the consequences of participants’ decisions
were more severe. Harris et al. attributed their effect to the
fact that, in case of severe consequences, the costs associated
with underestimating probability are high; individuals, therefore,
inflate their estimations of the probability of occurrence as a
preventive measure. However, this would happen only when
participants can make a decision based on these probabilities.
Importantly, Harris et al. (2009) suggested that the effects of
outcome severity would be larger under conditions of emotional
involvement. If this was the case, understanding how patients
make their medical decisions might require an assessment of their
comprehension of the objective information conveyed, but also
a consideration of how they interpret it on the basis of their
background (e.g., their previous perceptions of the disease and
remediation proposed or their attitudes toward them) as well as
their affect with regard to it.
Affect has been defined as the “specific quality of “goodness” or
“badness” (a) experienced as a feeling state and (b) demarcating a
positive or negative quality of a stimulus” (p. 312, Slovic et al.,
2004). Finucane et al. (2000) considered that people may base
their judgments of an item not only on what they thought
about it, but also on how they felt about it, and coined the
term “affect heuristic” to name this phenomenon. Loewenstein
et al. (2001) talked for the first time of the importance of
anticipatory emotions, i.e., immediate visceral reactions to risk
and uncertainty such as worry or anxiety, and proposed the “risk-
as-feelings hypothesis”. According to these authors, apparently
erratic decisions might be due to the fact that people’s emotional
reactions to risk respond to factors other than the cognitive
evaluation of risks, and are largely insensitive to differences in
probability. Finally, other studies such as Pachur et al. (2014)
have shown that individuals behave differently in affect-rich (e.g.,
concerning the side effects of a drug) and affect-poor (monetary)
contexts which are otherwise equivalent. Pachur et al. (2014)
concluded that affect acted as a “spotlight”, focusing people’s
attention on outcomes and leading them to neglect statistical
information.
Our aim in this study was to investigate whether previous
beliefs and affects related to the severity of a given medical
condition and a possible preventive measure might influence
the extent to which participants would recommend a loved
one or friend to use this measure. Furthermore, we wondered
whether these factors might affect the way they process the
probability information conveyed. In contrast with previous
research, perceived severity and the inconvenience caused by
the preventive measure were assessed before exposure to the
information in order to ensure that our participants’ responses
were not influenced by the data provided.
In addition to previous beliefs, perceived severity and
associated emotional reactions might also depend on the format
in which numerical information is presented. In a previous
study, we found that representing frequencies in the form of
icon arrays makes them easier to understand than presenting
them as Arabic digits, especially when having to infer posterior
probabilities (Tubau et al., 2018).1 However, Petrova et al. (2015)
concluded that visual aids only helped people for whom the
medical information provided was not too affectively imbued;
in contrast, people seeing the disease as extremely unpleasant
or severe did not pay attention to the statistical information
provided, and made their decision based on their previous beliefs
of the effectiveness of screening or their fear of the disease.
Also in the context of medical scenarios but with a different
approach, Timmermans et al. (2008) found that human icons
had more affective impact than frequencies or percentages, and
risks presented as icons were judged as more likely. Nevertheless,
format affected the decision in just one out of their four scenarios
and some uncontrolled features of the scenarios make it difficult
to extract general conclusions on the relationship between
affective response and the intention to recommend preventive
measures. All in all though, previous evidences suggested that
presentation format was a variable to take into account.
Finally, it is worth noting that the effects of previous beliefs
and affect might be also modulated by individual level of
numeracy. Numeracy is defined as “the ability to process basic
probability and numerical concepts” (Peters et al., 2006, p. 407).
People with low numeracy are not only less accurate in estimating
probabilities than their high in numeracy peers, but also more
prone to frame, text complexity and numerical format effects
(e.g., Peters et al., 2006, 2011; Johnson and Tubau, 2013).
Furthermore, previous studies have found differences between
people with low and high numeracy in both risk perception
and commitment to take certain decisions, with people with low
numeracy being less able to integrate probabilities and outcome
information, particularly in affect-rich contexts (e.g., Pachur
and Galesic, 2012). In contrast, emotions of people with high
numeracy vary more in proportion to the probability of the loss
than their peers (Petrova et al., 2014). Given these previous data,
we decided to assess the numeracy of our participants by asking
them to answer a selected sample of the items in the numeracy
scale by Lipkus et al. (2001; see section Materials and Procedure).
Participants in our experiment were presented with two
medical scenarios, one concerning breast cancer and the other
regarding hypertension. These two medical conditions were
1Most of previous studies using icons presented them together with numerical
frequencies and, perhaps because of this, mixed findings on format effects have
been reported (see for example the meta-analysis by McDowell and Jacobs, 2017).
Hence, to avoid potential confounds, our study used icons without the redundant
numerical information.
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selected because they were expected to differ in their perceived
severity. Our sample consisted of university students, mainly
women, in their early twenties: we hypothesized that, even
though hypertension is more prevalent than breast cancer and
has well-known possible negative consequences (e.g., a higher
likelihood of suffering an ictus or heart attack), it would not be
considered as lethal per se, especially by the sample in question.
In order to verify our hypothesis and assess our participants’
previous beliefs, we explored how severe they considered the
two medical conditions to be, before presenting them with any
prevalence data. We also asked them about their beliefs regarding
the two preventive measures they would have to recommend.
Subsequently, the two medical scenarios were proposed. Both
included information on the prevalence of the disease, as well
as data on a preventive measure. Health care campaigns often
stress the positive effects of preventive measures and tend to
omit the bothersome or even negative consequences of their use
such as overdiagnosis. As a result, people may be well disposed
to use them, even without considering the information provided
(Petrova et al., 2016). So, in order to avoid an indiscriminate “yes”
response to the recommendation, both health scenarios included
also a drawback of it.
After the presentation of the medical scenario, we asked
our participants again about the affect (worry) that the current
information had aroused in them. We also wanted to determine
how difficult they found it to understand the information
provided. Finally, we asked them to rate the prior and posterior
probabilities (see method) and to decide whether they would
recommend this remediation measure. Our predictions were as
follows. We expected that, prior to testing, participants would
view breast cancer as more severe than hypertension. As for the
perceived inconvenience of preventive measures, we did not have
any preconceptions: we merely wanted to measure participants’
previous beliefs and feelings. Regarding the subsequent items,
we expected that information on the more severe disease would
also be considered as more worrying. We also predicted that,
although participants would take into account the likelihood of
the events, the weight of numerical information on the decision
process might depend on the scenario: we expected that higher
levels of worry and severity would make participants more
likely to recommend preventive measures above and beyond the
perceived probabilities.
The statistical data for each scenario were presented either
verbally, with quantities reported as natural frequencies in
Arabic numerals, or through arrays of 100 icons (see Figure 1).
Regarding the format, we aimed to test two alternative
hypotheses. On the one hand, according to Timmermans et al.
(2008), higher vividness of the risks displayed as icons should
cause more affective response in participants than digits; this
should increase the perceived probability and the commitment
to recommend the preventive measure, especially in more severe
medical situations. We considered that this effect might be
maximized by the use of anthropomorphic figures, so we used
restroom-like icons. On the other hand, based on the above
mentioned benefit of icons for risk comprehension, we expected
more sensitivity to the probability information for the ratings in
this format.
Regarding the effect of numeracy, we hypothesized that people
with low numeracy would consider information to be harder to
understand than their high in numeracy peers, but they might
also see it as more worrying and more likely to occur. This,
in turn, might translate into a higher intention to recommend
the preventive measure, especially in the more severe medical
condition. In contrast, high-skilled participants might adjust
their recommendation more to the probability ratings.
In sum, two scenarios differing in severity were used to
investigate whether previous beliefs and affect related to a given
medical condition and a possible preventive measure might
influence the extent to which participants would recommend
to use this measure. Given previous evidences of the relevance
of these two variables in probability processing and decision
making, format was manipulated and numeracy of participants
was measured.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
One hundred and forty-three Psychology students [115 women
and 28 men, mean age = 23.37 (SD = 5.98)] from the University
of Barcelona took part in this experiment as part of their course.
Sensitivity analysis conducted with GPower (Faul et al., 2007)
shows that for our main variable of interest, i.e., severity of the
medical scenario, this sample size implies a minimal detectable
effect of f = 0.15, which is considered to be small according to
Cohen (1992).
Probabilistic reasoning and the Bayes rule were introduced
only after this session. Participants were free to join in the
experiment, and provided written consent for the use of their
data for research purposes. They were debriefed in a subsequent
session.
Materials and Procedure
Participants were presented with two health scenarios concerning
breast cancer and hypertension. Each scenario ended with the
possibility of using a preventive measure (mammogram/low-
sodium diet). Information was presented through icon arrays
(see Figure 1) to 71 and in the form of natural frequencies
(e.g., “3 of the 4 women with breast cancer and 12 of the 96
women without breast cancer receive a positive mammogram”)
to the rest (N = 72). Participants were randomly assigned to each
format condition. They were tested collectively, although each
one had their own computer and solved the task individually.
There were no time limitations for answering, although it took all
participants between 15 and 20 min to complete the whole task.
The procedure was as follows2. An initial screen informed
participants they would receive some data concerning the
prevalence of breast cancer, and asked them to rate how severe
they considered this disease and how inconvenient they thought
mammograms were. Participants were required to respond
using a 1-to-8 scale, on which a score of 1 meant hardly
2For the sake of clarity, here we describe one particular session; however, the order
of the two scenarios was counterbalanced across participants.
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FIGURE 1 | Iconic representation of the breast cancer problem (original
version in Spanish and in color).
severe/inconvenient at all and 8 highly severe/inconvenient.
A second screen reported the prevalence of breast cancer in
women over 50, and the reliability of mammograms for its
detection (prevalence: 4 of 100; hit rate: 3 of 4; false alarm rate:
12 of 96). It also noted that a positive mammogram result (true
or false) might require a needle biopsy to confirm it. In order to
avoid effects due to differences in individual memory, these data
remained on the screen until participants had answered all the
items on this medical scenario. Questions on this screen asked
participants how difficult they had found it to understand the
probability of suffering from breast cancer (1 = very easy; 8 = very
difficult) and how worrisome (1 = not worrisome at all; 8 = very
worrisome) they found the information provided. A third screen
asked participants to think about a friend or relative in this age
group and to rate the probability that she might suffer from
breast cancer (prior probability; 1 = very unlikely; 8 = very likely),
or that she might suffer from breast cancer if she had received
a positive result in the mammogram (posterior probability).
Finally, participants were requested to rate the extent to which
they would recommend the mammogram to their friend or
relative (1 = definitely not; 8 = definitely).
In the hypertension scenario, participants first had to rate the
severity of the condition and the inconvenience of following a
low-sodium diet. After this, they were provided with the base
rate of women over 40 suffering from this medical condition as
well as the rate of women following a sodium-rich diet with or
without hypertension (prevalence: 20 of 100; hit rate: 12 of 20;
false alarm rate: 24 of 80). They were also reminded that doctors
often recommend a low-sodium diet, even though many people
consider it to be unpleasant. Much as in the previous scenario,
participants were required to rate the difficulty of understanding
the information provided and how worrying it was (screen 2); the
probability that a friend or relative of this age might suffer from
hypertension, and the same probability if she followed a sodium-
rich diet (screen 3). Finally, participants were told that their
friend or relative was considering following a low-sodium diet
and they were asked to decide whether they would recommend it.
We also assessed participants’ numeracy using the four items
(see Appendix) rated by Peters et al. (2006) as the most difficult
ones on the numeracy scale of Lipkus et al. (2001). Three of these
items were the ones previously used by Schwartz et al. (1997).
Participants answered these questions at the end of the session.
RESULTS
We had hypothesized that the two scenarios would differ in the
previous beliefs and affect aroused by the medical condition and
remediation presented and that this might have consequences
in the likelihood of recommendations. Hence, our first analysis
was devoted to confirm the existence of differences between
the two medical scenarios. Given that we predicted that format
and numeracy might also have an effect on the comprehension
of the data and the affect aroused by them, we also entered
these two variables into the analysis. Nevertheless, for the sake
of comprehension, we will report the data concerning them
separately.
We conducted an ANOVA for each dependent variable
(responses to each question) with the medical scenario (breast
cancer and hypertension) as a within-participant variable, and
format (icons and natural frequencies) and numeracy (low
and high) as between-participant factors. As for numeracy,
participants were classified into two groups according to
their performance on the numeracy questionnaire: they were
considered as showing low numeracy (LN) if they had correctly
answered two items or fewer (N = 69) and as having high
numeracy (HN) if they had correctly answered three or four
(N = 74).
Effects of Scenario
For the sake of readability, F values, significance and descriptive
statistics are presented in Table 1. As expected, the effect
of scenario was significant for perceived severity, worry, prior
and posterior probability and recommendation rates. For worry
and probability ratings, scenario also interacted with format
and numeracy (see below). More specifically, participants
judged breast cancer to be significantly more severe than
hypertension. The breast cancer scenario also raised more worry
than the hypertension scenario, and the mammogram was
recommended significantly more frequently than the low-sodium
diet (see Table 1). Even if it was not theoretically relevant,
finding no effects of scenario in difficulty helped us discarding
that differences between scenarios were due to problems in
comprehending one of them. As for probabilities, the fact that
the ratings of the prior and posterior probabilities differed
across scenarios, with higher ratings for hypertension, indicates
that participants’ answers were sensitive to the disparity in the
numerical information provided in each of them.
Effects of Format
As above, here we report only significant effects. See Table 2 for a
detailed list of the descriptive statistics as well as F and p values.
Format affected difficulty, worry (in interaction with scenario
and numeracy; see below), and posterior probability rates (in
interaction with scenario). That is, the data presented through
icons were always judged to be easier to understand than data
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TABLE 1 | Effects of the medical condition (severity of the scenario).
Breast Cancer Hypertension
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) F values p η2p
Perceived severity 7.20 (0.96) 5.89 (1.20) F (1,139) = 160.40 <0.001 0.53
Inconvenience measures 4.17 (2.13) 4.09 (2.13) F (1,139) < 1
Difficulty 3.56 (1.87) 3.27 (1.64) F (1,139) = 3.17 0.07 0.022
Worry 5.14 (1.68) 4.83 (1.60) F (1,139) = 5.17 0.024 0.036
Prior probability 2.64 (1.48) 3.50 (1.51) F (1,139) = 43.52 <0.001 0.23
Posterior probability 4.14 (1.89) 5.03 (1.71) F (1,139) = 27.88 <0.001 0.16
Recommendation 7.34 (1.06) 5.60 (1.83) F (1,139) = 117.95 <0.001 0.45
Descriptive statistics [Mean and Standard Deviation (SD)] and comparison of responses to the breast cancer and hypertension medical scenarios.
TABLE 2 | Effects of format.
Breast Cancer Hypertension
Icons Frequencies Icons Frequencies
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) F values p η2p
Perceived severity 7.21 (.89) 7.19 (0.94) 5.74 (1.10) 6.04 (1.28)
Inconvenience 4.15 (2.24) 4.18 (2.04) 4.12 (2.22) 4.05 (2.05)
Difficulty 3.04 (1.76) 4.07 (1.84) 2.89 (1.59) 3.65 (1.62) Format: F (1,139) = 12.75 < 0.001 0.084
Worry 5.24 (1.66) 5.04 (1.71) 4.99 (1.61) 4.67 (1.58) Scenario x Numeracy x Format: F (1,139) = 3.88 0.051 0.027
Prior probability 2.49 (1.39) 2.78 (1.56) 3.52 (1.47) 3.47 (1.56)
Posterior probability 3.89 (1.79) 4.39 (1.96) 5.20 (1.75) 4.86 (1.67) Scenario x Format: F (1,139) = 6.29 0.013 0.043
Recommendation 7.35 (1.10) 7.34 (1.02) 5.83 (1.82) 5.38 (1.83)
Descriptive statistics [Mean and Standard Deviation (SD)] of the responses to each question and summary of results of the ANOVA investigating the differences between
icons and natural frequencies.
presented through written frequencies. Furthermore, participants
who received the information in iconic format were more
sensitive to variation in probabilities than those who saw it
as frequencies: only the posterior probability ratings based on
icons were correctly identified as differing across the scenarios
[t(70) = 5.73, p < 0.001 and t(71) = 1.86; p = 0.06 for
scenarios presenting icons and natural frequencies, respectively;
see Table 2].
Effects of Numeracy
Numeracy showed significant effects for difficulty, worry (in
interaction with scenario and format) and prior probability rates
(see Table 3). As expected, people with low numeracy rated
the information provided in both scenarios as more difficult to
comprehend than those scoring high in numeracy. They also
rated breast cancer as more worrying than people with high
numeracy when the data were presented through icons (means
of worry rates were 4.8 and 5.8 for HN and LN, respectively;
t(69) = 2.63, p = 0.01), but not in the case of natural frequencies
(mean of worry rate in either group was 5; t < 1). Last,
participants with low numeracy judged breast cancer to be more
likely than their high in numeracy peers (see Table 3).
Factors Influencing Recommendation
Our second analysis aimed at determining which variables
might have affected decisions in a particular medical scenario.
We first conducted a correlational analysis to check which
variables (numeracy, format, scores on the items concerning
disease severity, inconvenience caused by the preventive measure,
difficulty to comprehend and worrying, as well as the estimated
prior and posterior probabilities) significantly correlated with the
likelihood to recommend the preventive measure. Subsequently
we conducted a forced entry multiple regression for each scenario
introducing the significant variables in the correlation analyses as
potential predictors and using the scores in the recommendation
item as dependent variable.
Scenario 1. Breast Cancer
Commitment to recommend correlated significantly with disease
severity and worry (see Table 4). A model including these two
variables accounted for 12% of the variance, R2 = 0.12, adjusted
R2 = 0.11; F(2,140) = 10.17, p< 0.001. Disease severity and degree
of worrying were both significant predictors of participants’
recommendation (β = 0.29, p < 0.001 and β = 0.17, p = 0.02,
respectively) with disease severity receiving more weight.
Scenario 2. Hypertension
Commitment to recommend correlated significantly with
severity, worry, prior probability and posterior probability
(see Table 5). A model comprising these variables reached
significance, F(4,138) = 6.90, p < 0.001, and explained 16% of
the variance in the recommendation of participants: R2 = 0.16,
adjusted R2 = 0.14. When looking at each particular predictor,
only severity and posterior probability reached significance
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TABLE 3 | Effects of numeracy.
Breast Cancer Hypertension
Low
numerates
High
numerates
Low
numerates
High
numerates
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) F values p η2p
Perceived severity 7.23 (0.91) 7.18 (0.92) 6.01 (1.26) 5.78 (1.13)
Inconvenience 4.33 (2.25) 4.01 (2.02) 3.60 (1.99) 4.54 (2.17) Scenario × Numeracy: F (1,139) = 7.07 0.009 0.048
Difficulty 4.03 (1.86) 3.12 (1.79) 3.80 (1.70) 2.78 (1.43) Numeracy: F (1,139) = 14.65 <0.001 0.095
Worry 5.39 (1.69) 4.91 (1.65) 4.74 (1.74) 4.91 (1.46) Scenario × Numeracy: F (1,139) = 4.43 0.037 0.031
Scenario × Numeracy × Format: F (1,139) = 3.88 0.051 0.027
Prior probability 3.13 (1.74) 2.18 (1.01) 3.64 (1.57) 3.36 (1.45) Numeracy: F (1,139) = 8.35 0.004 0.057
Scenario × Numeracy: F (1,139) = 6.41 0.012 0.044
Posterior probability 4.32 (1.96) 3.97 (1.81) 5.25 (1.73) 4.82 (1.68)
Recommendation 7.27 (1.13) 7.41 (0.99) 5.54 (1.81) 5.66 (1.86)
Descriptive statistics [Mean and Standard Deviation (SD)] of the responses to each question and summary of results of the ANOVA investigating the differences between
low and high numerates.
TABLE 4 | Correlation analysis for the breast cancer scenario.
Severity Inconvenience Difficulty Worry Prior probability Posterior probability
Severity
Inconvenience 0.04
Difficulty 0.003 −0.02
Worry 0.08 0.08 0.13
Prior probability −0.09 0.01 0.35∗∗ 0.27∗∗
Posterior probability −0.01 −0.03 0.31∗∗ 0.14 0.29∗∗
Recommendation 0.31∗∗ −0.05 0.06 0.20∗ 0.11 0.08
**p < 0.01; *p < 0.05.
TABLE 5 | Correlation analysis for the hypertension scenario.
Severity Inconvenience Difficulty Worry Prior probability Posterior probability
Severity
Inconvenience −0.02
Difficulty −0.08 −0.05
Worry 0.23∗∗ 0.05 −0.04
Prior probability 0.09 −0.03 0.18∗ 0.29∗∗
Posterior probability 0.10 −0.08 0.15 0.36∗∗ 0.64∗∗
Recommendation 0.23∗∗ −0.13 0.02 0.29∗∗ 0.20∗ 0.31∗∗
**p < 0.01; *p < 0.05.
(β = 0.17, p = 0.02 and β = 0.25, p = 0.01, respectively) although
worry closely approached it (β = 0.16, p = 0.054).
DISCUSSION
Ideally, making a decision implies considering the consequences
of each choice as well as the probability that they may
happen. However, when dealing with affect-rich situations
such as deciding on medical treatments for ourselves or
our loved ones, other factors seem to come into play. Our
aim in this study was to investigate the role of previous
beliefs and emotions in two medical situations differing
in severity, i.e., in their negative consequences. Since the
comprehension of probabilities is affected by the presentation
format as well as by the numeracy skills of the recipient,
these two variables were also controlled. A sample of university
students were presented with two scenarios concerning breast
cancer (the more severe disease) and hypertension (less
severe) and two preventive measures that could be used to
minimize their effects. Participants were required to complete a
questionnaire regarding their beliefs, emotions and perception
of the probabilities provided. Importantly, in order to ensure
that a priori conceptions were measured, some of the items
had to be answered before the presentation of the medical
situation. The last question required participants to rate
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the extent to which they would recommend the preventive
measures.
As expected, participants rated breast cancer as significantly
more severe and worrying than hypertension and also
recommended mammograms more frequently than low-
sodium diets. Indeed, when analyzing the factors influencing
recommendation, only worry and severity – not probability
estimations – predicted the recommendation of mammograms.
Therefore, it seems that when participants had to decide on the
medical situation with the worse consequences (and presumably
the more affectively charged) they completely ignored the
likelihood data and based their decisions on previous beliefs and
current emotions. This result corroborates previous findings
indicating a “probability neglect” (Sunstein, 2002) in affect-rich
choices, or the existence of an “affect heuristic” (Finucane et al.,
2000).
It is worth mentioning that measures of severity and worry in
the breast cancer condition did not correlate (see Table 4), which
indicates that, although both items aimed to assess emotional
reactions, they were based on different sources. Indeed, only the
worry rating correlated significantly with the prior probability
rating meaning that emotions measured after the presentation of
the medical scenario might be more influenced by the perception
of the actual data contained in it. This finding reinforces our
idea that studies assessing the effects of a priori beliefs and
emotions should measure them before the medical scenario is
presented.
In contrast, the decision to recommend a low-sodium diet
was best explained by taking into consideration the posterior
probability, i.e. participants’ rating of the likelihood of suffering
from hypertension provided a high-sodium diet was followed,
and once again, severity. Therefore, our results seem to
indicate that even though all medical problems are traditionally
considered as affect-rich situations, probability information is
not necessarily ignored; the psychological impact of probability
information might depend on each particular medical condition,
and more specifically, on how negatively it is perceived.
Before continuing, a specification must be made: the two
scenarios differed in several aspects apart from severity, one
of them being that a low-sodium diet can directly lower the
chances of suffering from hypertension while mammogram
only indirectly lowers the chances of having a breast cancer
with worse consequences. Nevertheless, if this was the reason
participants answered differently in the two scenarios, we would
have expected that participants recommended the diet to a higher
degree. In contrast, they were significantly more committed to
recommend mammograms. The same would happen for prior
probability: even if chances of suffering from hypertension are
higher than those of having breast cancer, participants were more
committed to recommend the preventive measure for cancer.
Therefore, our results support the conclusion that differences
across scenarios are due to the perceived severity of the disease
described. If the medical condition is lived as severe and
worrying, people do not look at likelihood or effectiveness: they
simply recommend the proposed measure. In contrast, if the
medical condition is not considered as severe (hypertension),
they pay attention to the presented likelihoods, as shown by
the significant correlation between posterior probability and
willingness to recommend as well as by the fact that posterior
probability was a significant predictor of the participant’s
decision.
Our study also addressed two factors that are known to
have an effect on the difficulty of processing and understanding
likelihoods: format and numeracy. As far as format is concerned,
there were two reasons for its manipulation in this experiment.
On the one hand, most previous studies have found that
presenting probabilities with visual aids, such as icon arrays,
facilitates their comprehension compared to verbal formats such
as frequencies or percentages (e.g., Brase, 2009; Garcia-Retamero
and Hoffrage, 2013; Tubau et al., 2018). On the other hand,
other studies have stressed that icons, being a more vivid
representation of the likelihood of suffering bad consequences,
may have a higher emotional impact in affect-rich contexts and
may increase the perceived probability (e.g., Timmermans et al.,
2008). Our results provided support for both positions. First,
participants considered frequencies to be harder to understand
than icon arrays. Moreover, when asked to rate the posterior
probability of each medical scenario (20% vs. 33%) onto the
1-to-8 scale, they rated the probabilities displayed as icons
differently but provided equivalent ratings for the scenarios
presented as frequencies. We consider this as further evidence
that probabilities represented iconically are processed in a more
fine-grained way than frequencies and are easier to manipulate
and translate into context-appropriate scales. As for the effects
of format on emotions, our data also supported the hypothesis
that icons have a higher emotional impact, although their effects
were limited to specific circumstances: information provided in
the form of icon arrays was judged as more worrying than that
presented as frequencies only in the most severe scenario, and
only by participants with low numeracy. Therefore, we confirmed
that people with low numeracy are more affected by extraneous
factors (i.e. factors that do not affect objective probabilities) than
their peers (Reyna et al., 2009).
Numeracy had other effects as well. As expected, less skilled
individuals judged the information provided as more difficult to
understand. Moreover, they judged the likelihood of suffering
from breast cancer to be higher than their high-skilled peers.
According to Reyna et al. (2009), uncertainty about the meaning
of numerical information might lead people with low numeracy
to use other criteria, such as their affective interpretation of the
situation to judge probabilities or make their decisions. Given
that breast cancer was considered as the most severe situation, it
might have been perceived by people with low numeracy as being
more likely.
Overall, the results found in this research fit well inside
the fuzzy trace theory proposed by Reyna (2008). According
to this author, people extract verbatim and gist representations
of the information conveyed. The former are literal, precise
and quantitative representations, while gist representations
answer the question “what does the information mean to that
individual?,” a subjective interpretation of information that
would be based on education, culture and experience, and would
include the affective interpretation of this information. People
prefer to operate on gist representations and therefore their
actions might seem at odds with the objective information
provided. Other approaches mentioned in the introduction also
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stress the role that previous beliefs, particularly emotions, play
in the decision processes: the affect heuristic, the risk-as-feelings
hypothesis, or the view of affect as a spotlight stress the fact that,
when deciding in affect-rich contexts, outcomes are the main
consideration and their actual likelihood would be either less
important, dismissed (Finucane et al., 2000; Loewenstein et al.,
2001; Pachur et al., 2014), or misunderstood (e.g., by the low
numeracy participants in the present study).
Before concluding, we would like to mention two possible
limitations of this study that future research might seek to
overcome. First, despite the differences across scenarios and the
effects of format and numeracy mentioned above, in general
participants provided very high ratings of the probabilities in
both medical scenarios and in both formats. This was probably
due to the affect involved in these medical recommendations,
but it may also have been due to the scale we used. Items
had to be rated on an 8-point numerical rating scale with
verbal anchors (e.g., hardly severe at all–very severe). A similar
7-point rating scale had already been used in the literature
(see for instance Petrova et al., 2015 or Pighin et al., 2011).
Furthermore, Haase et al. (2013) concluded that verbal rating,
despite showing a slightly smaller correlation with the objective
measures than frequency or percentage scales (0.91 vs. 1), was a
sensitive measure and better predictor of intentions and decisions
than other scales. However, the fact that only eight categories
were used, and that the extreme ones were marked with verbal
labels, might have led participants to provide a meaningful
ordinal ranking of the probabilities (gist) displayed in the two
scenarios instead of a precise (verbatim) estimation (Haase et al.,
2013). Therefore, even if the 8-point probability ratings properly
reflected the disparity of probabilities presented in both medical
scenarios, they should not be taken as a direct extrapolation from
a 0-100 scale.
Second, the decision participants had to make did not concern
them but a friend or relative. Nevertheless, given that one of the
scenarios talked about a medical condition that mostly affects
women, we wondered whether they had felt particularly involved
and reacted differently from men. Unfortunately, we had not
controlled for gender and most of our participants were women
(115 vs. 28 men). Therefore, the following information must be
interpreted with caution; however, preliminary analyses suggest
that there might be gender differences. Recommendation in the
breast cancer scenario was best predicted by severity in the case of
women, R2 = 0.14, adjusted R2 = 0.13; F(1,113) = 19.07, p< 0.001;
β = 0.38, p< 0.001, and by posterior probability in men, although
the data in this case failed to reach significance, perhaps because
of the small sample R2 = 0.11, adjusted R2 = 0.07; F(1,26) = 3.24,
p = 0.08; β = 0.33, p = 0.08. Gender effects, though, might not
be due exclusively to the medical scenario; when we ran identical
analyses on the hypertension situation, we found new differences
between men and women. While the likelihood to recommend
the preventive measure in women was best explained by worry,
R2 = 0.06, adjusted R2 = 0.05; F(1,113) = 7.95, p = 0.006; β = 0.25,
p = 0.006, men’s behavior was predicted by a model comprising
posterior probability, β = 0.59, p = 0.001, severity β = 0.37,
p = 0.018 and difficulty β = −0.31, p = 0.049, F(3,24) = 7.68,
p = 0.001. Altogether, our current data seem to indicate that in
rich-affect contexts women may pay less attention to numbers
than men do, although better controlled future studies might
want to confirm this point.
Summarizing, previous perception of the severity of a given
medical condition modulates the use of probabilistic information
for decision-making. Future efforts to ensure informed consent
should not only focus on providing relevant data but may also
require a reassessment of previous beliefs and emotions, and, if
necessary, an attempt to correct them.
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APPENDIX
Items of the Numeracy Scale of Lipkus et al. (2001) used to test the participants’ numeracy:
(1) In the BIG BUCKS LOTTERY, the chances of winning a $10.00 prize are 1%. What is your best guess about how many people
would win a $10.00 prize if 1,000 people each buy a single ticket from BIG BUCKS?
(2) Imagine that we roll a fair, six-sided die 1,000 times. Out of 1,000 rolls, how many times do you think the die would come up
even (2, 4, or 6)?
(3) The chance of getting a viral infection is 0.0005. Out of 10,000 people, about how many of them are expected to get infected?
(4) In the ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES, the chance of winning a car is 1 in 1,000. What percent of tickets of ACME
PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES win a car?
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